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The Rise and Fall of State Banking:
Financial Market Politics in Postwar OECD Countries
State banking, defined as the intervention of the state in the allocation of 
credit, became important in some countries during the postwar era but not in 
others, and then more or less disappeared in the 1980s. The purpose of the 
article is to develop an explanation for longitudinal and cross-national varia­
tions in state banking for seventeen OECD countries. The paper argues that 
state banking was the unintended child of class politics; its subsequent demise 
is coterminous with the weakening of class politics and the reemergence of 
territorial politics. Competition between territorial jurisdictions is the normal 
mode of interest articulation and value redistribution in capital markets. Yet, 
the polarization of the party system along the class cleavage in countries 
where this party system was not dominated by one party, empowered 
categories of producers, who, under normal circumstances, would have been 
harmed by the play of market forces in the allocation of capital. They used 
this power to extract state banking. The progressive depolarization of all 
party systems stripped the small capitalists from their postwar leverage, and 
opened the way for the deregulation of state banking. The paper more 
generally argues that the current demise of state banking reflects the shift 























































































































































































The Rise and Fall of State Banking:
Financial Market Politics in Postwar OECD Countries
"A banker is a soldier in the 
service of the State."
Jean-Baptiste Colbert1
State banking is the direct intervention of the state in the allocation of 
credit. It is not to be confused with bank nationalization. Nationalization 
aims at redistributing bank profits. State banking, in contrast, aims at real­
locating bank credit. State banking became important in some countries dur­
ing the postwar era but not in others. State banking assumed considerable 
importance in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and New Zealand, 
but remained of limited importance in Britain, Italy, Germany, Japan, Spain, 
and Sweden, and was insignificant in Denmark, Canada, Switzerland, and the 
United States. The purpose of this study is to investigate what accounts for 
this peculiar variation.
Why study banking? Political scientists, with a few notable exceptions,2 
have traditionally neglected the study of banking. Comparative knowledge on 
how capital markets are organized, cleft, and of how distributive conflicts in 
that market are allocated, is scant.3 Capital alternatively appears as an 
employer4 or as the owner of fixed capital,5 but rarely as plain cash. This
1 Cited in Hu 1984:14.
2 Zysman 1983; Loriaux 1991; Perez 1997.
3 The phrases "capital market" and "financial market'' are used in this paper in reference 
to banks, not to equity markets. Equity markets, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, are 
essentially second-hand markets, which contribute very little to new investment—between 
1 and 10 percent depending on the OECD country. New investment is mainly self- 
financed or financed by banks.
4 This is the central theme of the literature on party systems and on corporatism.



























































































fact is reflected in the disproportionate interest lavished on the class cleavage, 
the defining cleavage of all labor markets, and, throughout most of this 
century, most party systems6; it is also reflected in the strong emphasis put on 
the sectoral cleavage, the defining cleavage of all vested capital involved in 
lobbying for a tariff or an exchange rate7; it is finally reflected in the lack of 
interest for the territorial cleavage, which is more typical of financial 
markets. Distributive conflicts in financial markets are usually territorial 
because cash, unlike labor and machinery, is inherently mobile, and mobility 
forces neighboring geographic entities, be they régions, landsleden, Kanton, 
Lander, provinces, States, or nation states, to vie for this factor of produc­
tion.8
There are imminent signs, however, that the class and sectoral cleavages 
are losing ground to the territorial cleavage. "Globalization," a general term 
referring to the fact that capital has become more mobile, both within and 
between countries, is making domestic financial markets central again in the 
allocation of gains and losses. Broader market openness and greater central 
bank independence, by removing opportunities of lobbying for tariffs and cur­
rency undervaluation, are putting the sectoral cleavage out of business, 
literally so.9 The class cleavage-still the defining cleavage of most party 
systems—is losing relevance to its traditional rival. Local communities are 
increasingly active in the competition for investment, irrespective of partisan 
color.10 Tasks until now assumed by national governments are either 
privatized to companies operating in global markets, decentralized to local
6 The literature is huge. See among others, Rokkan 1970, Bartolini and Mair 1990, and 
Bartolini's monumental study (1997).
7 Frieden 1991. Frieden and Rogowski 1996.
8 See Krugman 1993.
9 Of course, changes in trade policy and monetary institutions are still fought along 
sectoral lines; see Eichengreen and Frieden 1994, Milner 1997.




























































































governments, or delegated to regional, supranational entities (EU, NAFTA, 
ASEAN).11 I will show that state banking, which appeared in the 1920s and 
flourished in the 1950s, was the unintended child of class politics; its sub­
sequent demise is coterminous with the weakening of class politics and the 
reemergence of territorial politics.
Four explanations of state banking can be found in the admittedly-small 
comparative literature on postwar banking. The traditional view is that state 
banking is a functional response to a market failure. The idea was initially 
propounded by Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) in his account of Russian 
industrialization. The more capital was needed in the shortest amount of 
time, Gerschenkron argued, the less could private fortunes and equity 
markets cope with the task of allocating long-term financial capital; instead, 
banks had to step in. State banking, in Gerschenkron's argument, entered the 
picture as ultimate substitute for profit banking, would the latter prove unable 
to meet the demand for investment. Gerschenkron's argument has been 
faulted for two weaknesses: first, a functionalist causality, mistaking what in 
effect was a policy choice-high growth—for a constraint, and, second, case 
selection, overlooking governments that chose not to pursue a high-growth 
policy.
A second line of argument stresses the unique opportunities offered by 
American hegemony and the Cold War. Michael Loriaux (1991) argues that 
state banking in France was an instance of Hicks' "overdraft economy," in 
which private investment is bankrolled by the central bank. A string of weak 
French governments pursued full employment at the cost of inflation, passing 
on the negative effects to France's trade partners through recurring devalua­
tions of the franc, under the pretext that any other policy might lead to a
3




























































































strengthening of communism in France and elsewhere. The decline of 
American hegemony, but even more so the deliberate attempts by successive 
U.S. governments to stop that decline, removed the preconditions for state 
banking. Loriaux' argument carries the study of state banking beyond the 
limited notion of economic efficiency. State banking, in his work, is not just 
an efficient way of channeling capital to fast-growing sectors, but also a 
means of buying the political support of the sectors that are condemned by 
rapid industrialization. Loriaux’ argument is also useful in understanding the 
universal demise of state banking.12 However, no systemic variable can 
account for the cross-national variation in state banking. Indeed, why did 
only a handful of countries take advantage of American hegemony to create 
an overdraft economy?
A third line of argument underscores the importance of cross-national 
variations in domestic institutions. John Zysman (1983) attributed the exist­
ence of "state-directed, price-administered” financial system in France and 
Japan to the existence of a strong state. He contrasted the state-directed 
model with the Anglo-Saxon "market-based" model, and the German private- 
bank-organized credit market.13 The weakness with this line of argument was 
best stated by Sofia Perez (1997:169): "Like other work within the 
institutionalist literature, Zysman’s typology was premised on the assumption 
that institutional attributes, reflecting national historical legacies, are rela­
tively stable over time. Yet, this premise has been challenged by the unravel­
ing of the cross-national pattern of regulatory divergence that Zysman cap­
tured.”14 Good at revealing cross-national variations, institutionalism offers 
no grip on historical change.
12 For an attempt to generalize parts of the argument to other national experiences, see 
Loriaux 1997.
13 See also Shonfield 1965, and Hu 1984.




























































































In her own work, Sofia Perez (1997) sought to explain differences in 
banking outcomes in Spain, France, and Italy by linking it to differences in 
the relative strength of the communist left. The presence of a strong leftist 
challenge in France and Spain, she argued, forced governments to choose a 
"soft model of interventionism," whereas the temporary weakness of the left 
in Italy made possible the use of "direct political control over credit allocation 
through state ownership of financial institutions" (Perez 1997:171). Although 
insightful, the emphasis on left strength, in Perez's formulation, fails to 
generalize; the communist left was weak in all European countries but 
France, Finland, and hypothetically Spain, where its visible manifestation 
was suppressed, and yet state banking also emerged in Belgium, Norway, the 
Netherlands, and New Zealand.
More generally, the propositions formulated in the recent literature are 
induced from a small (and most likely unrepresentative) sample of cases; they 
are not examined and tested systematically in a true comparative framework. 
The present paper is an attempt in this direction. Several propositions are 
derived from a simple model of state-bank relations and tested on a large sub­
set of OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) 
countries.
The argument developed here builds on a simple model of market- 
government relations. The capital market is subject to scale economies and, 
if left unregulated, to concentration, with harmful effects for smaller banks 
and their clients. The government is subject to electoral pressure, with an 
intensity that varies across countries depending on the nature of the political 
institutions. Being less wealthy and credit-worthy, but more numerous than 
the large banks and companies that benefit from market concentration, the 
smaller banks and their clients have a relatively greater chance to fend off the 



























































































If the government is not excessively vulnerable to electoral retribution, at 
least in the short-term, then the government will be able to resist pressure for 
banking regulations, offering compensation perhaps under another form. If 
instead the government is dependent on electoral competition for its short­
term survival, then expected losers will succeed in having it regulate the 
financial market and carve out segments in which small banks can be 
sheltered from the competition of bigger banks. Segmentation may cut along 
regional lines, with banks enjoying locational rents, or sectoral lines, with 
banks catering to specialized clienteles~a bank for small business, a bank for 
agriculture, a bank for home-owners, and so on. State banking, in its 
postwar materialization, was a case of sectoral segmentation.
The present model casts light on three aspects of postwar banking. 
First, state banking developed after World War II, I argue, in response to the 
rise in power of categories of producers (to whom I will refer as "small capi­
talists"), who, under normal circumstances, would have been harmed by the 
play of market forces in the allocation of capital. The small capitalists 
became a courted bunch when and where the class cleavage became the 
vehicle for interest articulation. They owed this political windfall to the 
polarization of the party system along the class cleavage in countries where 
this party system was not dominated by one party.
Second, the development of state banking in the postwar decades was 
only one manifestation of the side-stepping of the market; another non-market 
path was the protection of local banking, still another, the promotion of non­
profit banking. Following mainstream institutionalist literature, I argue that 
the choice of state banking over local or nonprofit banking was determined by 
the relative degree of centralization of the state. State banking emerged in 
countries with centralized state institutions (France, postwar Belgium), non­




























































































Austria), and local banking remained relatively strong in countries with fed­
eral institutions (Switzerland, the United States). In all three cases, the large 
banks saw their growth hampered, losing market share to these other forms 
of banking. The extent to which large banks fell behind depended on the 
extent to which small capitalists could exploit the coalitional opportunities 
afforded by the overarching conflict between labor and capital.
Third, the progressive depolarization of all party systems, which started 
in the 1960s, gathered momentum in the 1970s, and was completed in the 
1980s initiated a shift to a model of mass politics more akin to median voting, 
which stripped the small capitalists from their postwar leverage, and opened 
the way for the deregulation of most forms of non-competitive banking, state 
banking especially.
A first section develops the a-priori notion that capital markets are sub­
ject to concentration. The second and third sections derive the identity of the 
potential losers and map out their nonmarket options. The fourth section 
develops the class politics hypothesis. The fifth section develops the 
institutionalist hypothesis. The penultimate section surveys the recent demise 
of class politics. A concluding sections recalls, and expands on, the findings.
7
The Secular Trend Toward Market Concentration in Banking
Capital markets, if left unchecked, are subject to oligopolistic concentra­
tion. "The development of capitalist industry," wrote Hilferding, "produces 
concentration of banking..." (1981:223). The reason that he advanced for 
banking concentration was the parallel concentration of industrial enterprise. 



























































































started in the second half of the 19th century, and released the powerful scale 
economies which today are the hallmark of the banking sector.
Paradoxically, concentration is not an obvious profit-maximizing 
strategy for bankers. Lending is a risky activity, requiring a relatively 
uninformed lender to entrust his money with a better-informed borrower. 
The literature on asymmetric information asserts that, in such conditions, 
absent trust, transactions fail.15 This is why banking until the mid-19th 
century relied on personal connections. Bankers would borrow from, and 
lend to, individuals whom they knew well, either because they lived in the 
same towns or because borrowers and bank shareholders were often the same 
people—a relation that Naomi Lamoreaux has appropriately dubbed "insider 
lending."16 Insider lending afforded no economies of scale. One of the 
largest banking house of the time, the Rothschild's, was a family affair, and 
banked only with a small coterie of princes and finance ministers.17
However, as the benefits of industrialization began to penetrate deeper 
into the middle strata, the demand for deposit accounts, both short and long, 
grew to a point that it became conceivable for private bankers to finance lend­
ing with deposits taken from numerous individuals with whom they had no 
prior or other dealings. The depersonalization of deposit taking was only 
half-of-the-story, however, and would have been insufficient in triggering 
amalgamation if lending had remained of the "insider" kind. The fact is that 
the deposit revolution caused a revolution in lending as well. The reason is a 
bit technical and requires a short detour in the economics of risk.
Banks face two kinds of risk. First, like all businesses, banks face an 
insolvency risk, which is the case when liabilities grow larger than assets.
8





























































































Second, as banks, they face the additional risk of illiquidity; illiquidity is a 
mismatch between the maturity profile of a bank's resources and that of its 
assets-assets cannot be realized soon enough to face outstanding claims. Illi­
quidity may occur if the average maturity of the bank resources becomes 
shorter, or if that of its assets becomes longer, or both. Both types of risk, 
furthermore, can either be systematic (a business downturn affecting the 
economy as a whole) or non-systematic (it is particular to an industry, caused 
by a labor strike, an obsolete technology, an import shock, etc.).
Individuals in general protect against nonsystematic risk through port­
folio diversification. Banks can achieve portfolio diversification by opening 
branches in multiple regions, offering a different industrial mix. Branching 
is the first step toward concentration, though a modest one. To guard against 
systematic illiquidity, in contrast, banks need to specialize, either in short- or 
long-term banking. The reason is the following. Cyclical business 
downturns typically freeze assets (the bank cannot sell but at an unacceptable 
loss) but melt liabilities (actual terms of deposit grow shorter, as depositors 
get anxious), thereby worsening the mismatch in maturity profiles between 
the two sides of the balance sheet. The extent of the mismatch depends, of 
course, on the intensity of the crisis, which is unpredictable, but also on the 
range of maturity between the most and least liquid assets. Mixing 1-day­
long with 1-year-long assets makes the bank more vulnerable to an illiquidity 
crisis than mixing 1-day-long with 3-month-long or 6-month-long with (-year­
long assets.
Since the middle of the 19th century deposits have been the most impor­
tant source of cash for banks. Deposits are short-term resources, since even 
an early-withdrawal penalty scheme would hardly stop a poorly informed, 
panic-prone depositor confronted with the danger of a bank run from cashing 




























































































forced banks to guard against the risk of illiquidity by specializing in short­
term lending.
Short-term lending in turn released powerful scale economies. It 
allowed for the development of standard lending procedures and, thus, more 
interchangeable and negotiable instruments, which could be used as sec­
ondary forms of liquidity. Lending lost its personal touch, the professionally- 
trained, appointed-by-the-center branch manager displacing the well- 
connected and well-informed local banker. Combined with the deposit 
revolution, the standardization and professionalization of lending opened the 
way to amalgamation. Amalgamation reduced bank capital requirements, 
improving earning potential. Amalgamation also allowed merging banks to 
rationalize their asset portfolio, taking over the best paper held by their com­
petitors and liquidating less desirable items.18
Amalgamation naturally led to centralization—the relocation of bank 
headquarters in financial centers. Centralization allowed banks to capture 
external scale economies: central clearing permitted banks to economize on 
working balances while the greater breadth of the market increased the 
liquidity of security issues.19 Moreover, centralization permitted banks to 
enter lucrative lines of activity, such as the underwriting of government and 
railroad loans. Centralization finally led to internationalization, since among 
these government loans, figured those to foreign governments, until then the 
exclusive province of prestigious private banking houses.20 The upshot was 
the founding of the gigantic joint-stock banks of today, also known as deposit 
banks.
Similar trends toward banking are at work today. Various financial 
services such as savings accounts, mutual funds, and insurance have become
18 Lamoreaux 1994, 144.
19 Kindleberger 1978, pp. 72-75.




























































































to a large extent close substitutes for each other. As a result, financial 
institutions, once operating in their traditional segment, have become exposed 
to new forms of competition from different types of institutions. Dis­
intermediation, a process by which a high-grade borrower issues bonds and 
commercial paper rather than taking loans while savers invest their bank 
deposits into mutual funds, is also forcing banks to scramble for new lines of 
business—riskier ones such as lending to developing countries, to real estate 
and energy sectors. Disintermediation is also forcing banks to develop fee­
generated business, once reserved to investment banks. The spree of bank 
concentration that has greeted the last twenty years or so of deregulation 
bears witness to the concentration proclivity of banking, whenever left to its 
own (market) forces.21
In sum, capital markets are subject to concentration. But they are not 
concentrated for all that. The fact is that concentration has harmful effects 
for smaller banks and their clients, two constituencies that may appeal to the 
government to curb concentration. This is the next point.
11
Potential Losers
Banking concentration has important wealth effects that go beyond the 
absorption of small banks by larger banks. Nonprofit banks, savings banks 
especially, stand to lose depositors. Credit cooperatives find it difficult to 
grow beyond the limited scope of their founding statutes and engage in more 
lucrative forms of banking. The local banks' clients, the small- and medium­
21 See Koguchi 1993. It is interesting to note that economists have failed so far to reach a 
consensus on the existence of scale and scope economies in banking; for a summary of 
extant research, see Forestieri 1993. This has not stopped bankers from expanding up to 
the limit allowed to them by extant regulatory frameworks and, whenever they could, to 



























































































sized firms, which are too large to rely on internal funding, yet not large 
enough to raise external capital on the equity markets, are hurt by the dis­
appearance of local banks and the center banks' disengagement from long­
term lending to industry.22 More generally, the monopolizing of deposit 
taking by a handful of risk-averse, center-located banks, each at the head of a 
countrywide network of branch offices, threatens to drain local districts from 
individual savings and channel these savings instead into national and foreign 
government-backed paper. Local governments find it harder to place their 
paper with local investors while the industrial vitality of regions with a con­
centration of small- and medium-sized firms is depressed. The circle of 
potential losers from market concentration further widens with the globaliza­
tion of finance. Such a globalization, as it existed before 1913 under the gold 
standard and is currently re-emerging, makes banks less dependent on their 
national pools of depositors to finance their assets, and less dependent on 
domestic demand for the selection of such assets. Globalization also subjects 
states to inefficient competition for capital, high-tax state losing financial 
business to low-tax states.
Potential victims from market concentration typically try to pursue a 
nonmarket strategy, involving governmental intervention. Two nonmarket 
strategies have historically been used in the area of capital market politics: 
territorial politics and class politics.
12
Territorial Politics and Class Politics
The articulation of distributional conflicts in capital markets differ from 
that in labor markets. In most European countries, labor market politics, pit­
22 The idea (also known as the financial "pecking-order") that firms at different phases in 
their life cycle present different types o f information asymmetry, calling for a different 



























































































ting unionized employees against their employers, is class politics. Class 
politics is an instance of categorial politics, emphasizing the functional dis­
tribution of societal interests—employers, employees, savers, borrowers, and 
so on. Capital market politics rarely is categorial politics stricto sensu: we 
never see savers' associations debating and settling interest rates with bor­
rowers' associations. The reason is that capital, in its saved form, is ter­
ritorially mobile. It can choose its legal jurisdiction at a cost that is 
systematically lower than that faced by labor, machines, products, and any 
other kind of wealth. Of course, a legal jurisdiction may try to curb this 
mobility through capital border controls. But this is only valid for nation 
states; local governments cannot regulate flows directly. Even in the case of 
nation states, making capital captive never is effective, as not all crossborder 
capital flows should be dammed, especially no those generated by trade and 
investment.
If savings cannot be captured, they must be courted. If firms want to 
have access to capital at better conditions than extant market rates, they must 
convince their local or national government to compete for external capital. 
Governments can, for instance, subsidize local bank deposits, a measure 
which has the effect, first, of attracting outside capital, second, of keeping 
internal capital in, and, third, due to scale economies, of barring entry by 
outside banks. In countries mandating unit (single-office) banking, Norway 
and the United States, local governments can directly curb entry by outside 
banks, thus raising the price of exit for local savers. In addition to subsidiz­
ing banks, governments can try to make their own bonds more attractive to 
outside investors and use the proceeds to subsidize bank lending locally. All 
these policies target societal interests that are distributed territorially: they try 






























































































Although most policies directed toward the capital market are products 
of territorial politics, there is a significant exception. State banking, a form 
of banking that redistributes income from taxpayers to industrial sectors, is a 
case of categorial politics. State banking redefines the distributional conflict 
from one being between locales to one involving functional actors: small capi­
talists (grouped into sectors), taxpayers (funding the policy), and working- 
class parties (supporting the policy). The alliance of working-class parties 
with the small capitalists, I will show later, was instrumental in developing 
state banking. Involving sectors, taxpayers, and labor, state banking was an 
instance of categorial, indeed of class, politics.
Distributional conflicts in the capital markets were allocated according to 
territorial politics until World War I. Except for Britain, most countries did 
not start having a modern party system, featuring a competition between 
freely-elected mass parties, until the turn of the century. In these proto- 
democratic systems, the partisan (class politics) route was unavailable. Small 
capitalists could only appeal to their local governments. The territorial route 
was open, provided, however, that local governments enjoyed regulatory 
authority over local banking, or political representation in an upper chamber 
at the national level, or both. This condition was only realized in politically 
decentralized countries. Only in decentralized countries were nonprofit and 
local banking sectors able to extract enough subsidies, guarantees, and 
regulatory obstacles to branching, to check the joint-stock banks' inroad into 
local deposits.
The regime changes and partisan realignments of the interwar and 
postwar periods opened up the route of class politics at the national level. In 
many countries, the unusual mobilization of people and resources that 



























































































autocracies, raised voters' political expectations.23 The appearance on the 
partisan scene of socialist parties intent on reforming capitalism gave a boost 
to partisan competition. The rise of the class cleavage and the advent of 
socialist governments increased the small capitalists' electoral influence and 
their coalitional leverage.
The small capitalists acquired political influence in party systems that 
were cleft along the class cleavage and that had strong left governments. 
There are several reasons for this. The class cleavage, first, created 
opportunities for groups with no prior affiliation to the working and capitalist 
classes. Groups of small capitalists, such as farmers, artisans, small mer­
chants and manufacturers, and workers on their own account, who, until 
then, had been scattered around the party spectrum, in many cases found 
themselves in the strategically enviable position of arbitrating the electoral 
competition between capital and labor. The right needed their support to 
fight the political battles of big business, whereas the left needed their support 
to stem the tide of nationalist, anti-democratic movements.
In banking matters, second, the working class was the enemy of the 
small capitalists' enemies—the large capitalists. Since working-class parties 
could rarely govern alone, they needed the small capitalists' support in order 
to stay in power. The regulation of the capital market was the ideal terrain of 
entente between two partners who, otherwise, especially with respect to labor 
market issues, had little in common.
Third, party systems with strong left parties were polarized, and 
polarization empowered the small capitalists. Polarization thinned the ranks 
of unorganized median voters, thereby enhancing the small capitalists' 
leverage.24 Polarization, indeed, reflects a bimodal distribution of the elec­
23 See Luebbert 1991.




























































































torate, in which the floating center is, if not “empty" as Giovanni Sartori 
(1976) starkly put it, at least not the most densely populated spot on the 
partisan continuum. Depolarization, in contrast, describes a case in which 
voters are normally distributed around the center, with parties converging in 
their policy offerings to gain support from the densely populated median. In 
the latter case, often referred to as the median voting model, organized inter­
est groups have their electoral weight diluted within the larger mass of 
median voters.25
More importantly, ideological polarization in some, but not all cases, 
empowered organized interests at the expense of unorganized ones. In 
countries where polarization was such that all-out competition was not 
deemed viable by political elites, lest it destabilize the political institutions, 
elites sought instead to form a cartel encompassing all organized interests— 
workers, employers, agrarians and other small capitalists. Government 
cartels took the forms that have traditionally been analyzed by the consocia- 
tional literature: grand coalition and Proporz in Austria, multiple executive in 
Switzerland, and so forth.26
Note that, in the spirit of the consociational literature, federalism is a 
sub-set of polarization. It is a form of cartelization between territorially- 
defined interests, adopted to mitigate territorial tensions. Moreover, federal 
systems, as already suggested, do empower small capitalists, given the lat­
ter's political entrenchment in local governments. The substantive difference 
between territorial and class polarization is that only the latter was a response 
to the rise of working-class movements in the interwar and immediate 
postwar era; only class polarization would start fading away in the 1960s.






























































































Therefore, keeping aside the federalist case, it is possible to argue that 
the partisan realignment along class lines that took place during the first half 
of the century empowered the small capitalists because they were small, well 
organized, ideologically unattached to the working class or the capitalist 
right, and available for tactical alliances with working-class parties against 
large capitalists.
Polarization was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the 
empowerment of the small capitalist classes. Another was the existence of 
competition, be it all-out or contained through the organization of an 
encompassing cartel by right and left parties. Competition required that the 
regime be, first, democratic, and that the party system, second, not be 
dominated by one party—right and left parties (or coalitions thereof) had to be 
of roughly equal weight. Spanish autocracy made the small capitalists' elec­
toral support irrelevant, whereas one-party dominance in Japan, Italy, and, to 
a lesser extent, Sweden and Norway made it somewhat redundant.
Given that autocracy is also a form of monopoly, of the left in com­
munist systems, of the right in the Spanish case, I will treat autocracy and 
one-party dominance as two instances of partisan monopoly. Autocracy 
achieves monopoly through the deliberate disfranchising of the opposition, 
whereas one-party dominance produces the same outcome for purely circum­
stantial reasons (American diplomatic pressure on Italy during the Cold War, 
for instance). The opposite of monopoly is proportionality, under which 
parties enjoy an equitable share of government. Partisan proportionality can 
be reached either through fair competition or equitable cartelization.
The model yields two testable predictions. The first is the left 
hypothesis. Large, profit-oriented banks should have experienced the greatest 
setbacks in party systems with strong working-class parties. The second 



























































































have experienced the greatest setbacks in party systems that were the least 
monopolized by a party of the right or the left. The rationale for the monop­
oly hypothesis is that, in conditions of polarization, monopolistic party 
systems, in which governmental outcomes reflect neither partisan competition 
nor encompassing cartelization, are the least likely to empower small capi­
talists. Note that the two hypotheses point to conflicting effects with respect 
to the special case of left monopoly. On the one hand, the small capitalists 
should be advantaged by a left, anticapitalist government. On the other hand, 
a monopolist left has no need for the small capitalists' support.
18
The Regulation of Concentrated. Profit Banking: Evidence
This section presents systematic evidence for the left and monopoly 
hypotheses. The dependent variable measures the asset shares of the four 
banking sectors. The first banking sector is the concentrated sector, made up 
of large, branched-out profit-oriented banks. It is the only sector in which 
banks directly compete with each other and in which the concentration logic 
discussed above is observable. Competition in the other three sectors is regu­
lated. One is the non-profit sector, made up of savings banks and various 
forms of cooperatives, including mortgage societies. Another is the state sec­
tor, which is composed of postal giro, postal savings, and of state banks. 
With the exception of postal banks, state banks are usually financed through 
bonds; they do not take deposits. A last category comprises local, private- 
oriented banks, chartered by local governments. This category is only valid 
in the two federal cases of the United States and Switzerland. This break­
down provides a better measure of concentration in banking than the usual 
indices of concentration. Knowing the market share of the five or ten largest 



























































































by standard concentration indices, reveals concentration in the concentrated 
sector alone, obscuring the fact that competition in banking operates through 
the legal segmentation of the market. The most important political debates in 
banking have borne on the boundaries between these four banking sectors.
Table 1 provides successive snapshots of the relative market shares of 
each sector for 17 OECD countries in 1913, 1938, 1963, and 1983. The con­
centrated, profit-oriented sector retreated until the mid-sixties, regaining 
some of the lost ground thereafter. The decline began in the 1920s, initiated 
at first by the deflationary policies pursued by all central banks following the 
inflation of the war and immediate postwar. Making safe placements attrac­
tive, deflation reallocated savings from commercial banks to saving banks. 
Deflation also made it hard for commercial banks to get their advances reim­
bursed, causing many of them to fail. Instability reinforced the public's 
renewed attraction for existing state and nonprofit savings banks, worried 
depositors merely seeking the state guarantee which these sectors enjoyed.
[ Table 1 ]
The regulatory measures that were adopted in the wake of the almost 
general banking crisis of 1931 accentuated the large banks' relative decline. 
Drawing the lesson that universal (multipurpose) banks had fared worse than 
specialized ones, governments tried to tear banks away from universality, 
through artificial requirements of liquidity rules, reserve requirements, and 
the separation of deposit from investment banking.27 The joint-stock banks 
were cut down to size and their future expansion was contained. While these 
measures could—and were—defended in the name of greater solvency, they 
were biased in favor of the non-concentrated banking sector. The U.S. case
27 Universal bank systems are the opposite o f specialized bank systems: in specialized 
systems some bankers lend long (or, more precisely, are ready to risk the immobilization 
of their assets), whereas others can only lend short; in universal banking systems, in 




























































































is telling in that respect. The unit (single-office) banks suffered the most 
from the crisis, confirming the well-established fact that single-office banking 
is a less stable form of banking than branch banking. Yet unit banking in the 
United States was not only left untouched, but made viable through the crea­
tion of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), a mandatory 
insurance scheme for small deposits, equalizing the otherwise unequal illi­
quidity risk between small banks scattered across rural areas and large banks 
gathered in financial centers.
These measures were kept unchanged, indeed reinforced, during the 
postwar decades. The concentrated banking sector kept losing market share 
to its rivals, except in Denmark and Australia where it increased, and Italy 
and Canada, where it remained unchanged. A potent mechanism through 
which governments favored peripheral banking at the expense of concentrated 
banks during the postwar era was macroeconomic policy. The overall 
Keynesian orientation of monetary policy in the postwar decades, combined 
with interest groups' jockeying for rents, had inflationary effects, against 
which central banks responded by tightening the liquidity constraints of the 
banks falling under their regulatory rule, that is, mostly commercial banks. 
Created to avoid another crisis of illiquidity, the liquidity ratios were diverted 
from their initial goal and used, instead, to contain inflation. Being spared 
from these restrictions in all countries but Germany, savings banks, credit 
cooperatives, savings and loans in the U.S., mortgage banks, building 
societies in the U.K., installment finance companies, state banks, insurance 
companies, and so forth, expanded their market share at the expense of com­
mercial banks.28
The second fact to note, and against which I will test the left and monop­
oly hypotheses, is the existence of a wide cross-sectional variation in banking
20



























































































structures. In 1963, for instance, the concentrated, profit-oriented banks con­
trolled 40 percent or more of total banking assets in ten countries (Canada, 
UK, Spain, Japan, Italy, Australia, France, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark) and 
less than 40 percent in seven countries (New Zealand, the United States, Nor­
way, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland) (see Table 1).
The dependent variable is the 1963 percentage share of the concentrated, 
profit-based banking sector measured in assets. The first hypothesis to test is 
the left hypothesis-the idea that the cross-national variation was a positive 
function of the political power of the working class. Measuring the left 
hypothesis requires the combined use of two variables—one measuring the 
spatial notion of left, another measuring its content. One can get a spatial 
notion of the dominant orientation of the government by ranking parties from 
left to right, then positioning them on a 0-1 ratio scale according to their 
respective electoral weight, calculating the location of each government, and 
last averaging over successive governments over the period desired, weight­
ing each government by its duration. The index is included in the regressions 
as Right Orientation 1945-1969. A higher value is associated with a more 
rightward position on the partisan axis. The index is calculated and reported 
in the appendix. The variable is available for the period 1945-1969, some­
what overshooting the dependent variable. This index provides a purely spa­
tial definition of left and right without controlling for ideology. British 
Laborites, Canadian Liberals, U.S. Democrats are equated with Swedish 
Social-Democrats. The left hypothesis, however, applies to working-class 
parties in the context of a polarized party system. There is the need, there­
fore, to control for ideological polarization. Measuring ideological polariza­
tion is tricky in the present setup. The presence of a strong communist party, 
which is the usual proxy for polarization,29 is undesirable here, for, in the
21



























































































context of the Cold War, a strong communist presence had the counter­
productive effect of empowering the right, not the left—and not the small cap­
italists either. I settled, instead, for a dummy variable (Anglo-Saxon), on the 
grounds that working-class parties were liberal or laborite in Anglo-Saxon 
countries but Marxist on the European continent.
The second hypothesis to test is the monopoly hypothesis, according to 
which the concentrated banking sector's share is a negative function of the 
degree of monopoly of the political system. Monopoly refers to an inter­
partisan distribution of government responsibilities that is not commensurate 
with the distribution of votes; monopoly is the opposite of fair access to 
power, whether fairness is achieved through perfect competition or 
encompassing cartelization. This variable is measured by the extent to which 
a party's percentage of time in government is disproportionate to its share of 
the popular vote. Any gross deviation from the strict equality between the 
proportion of votes and that of time in office indicates a slide toward political 
monopoly. For example, with 41 percent of the vote on average, the Italian 
Christian democrats were in government without interruption over the period 
of the model—1945-1979; after discounting for the fact that the Christian 
democrats often governed in coalition with other parties, their office share 
amounts to 84 percent—43 percent above the electoral benchmark of 41 per­
cent. Equivalent figures for the Italian communists are 24 percent and 0.5 
percent, yielding a deficit of 23.5 percent for that party. By way of contrast, 
with 45 percent of the vote, the German Christian democrats had, over the 
same period, an in-government score of 51 percent—a "profit" of only 6 per­
cent. The corresponding ratios for the German socialists are 37 percent and 
33 percent, yielding a deficit of 4 percent only. From these individual party 
scores, it is possible to construct a systemwide score, which summarizes, for 




























































































Because in many countries parties do have to take turns in power, the monop­
oly scale makes sense only if calculated over the long term (1946-December 
31, 1979); over a shorter run, the measure would overestimate monopoly in 
party systems with few parties. 1980 is a timely cutting point, because the 
late 1970s witnessed a clustering of institutional changes—democratization in 
Spain, return to partisan competition in France, and partisan realignments in 
Sweden, Britain, the United States. Special allowances also have to be made 
for the United States, in light of the presidential nature of the institutions, and 
for autocratic Spain. The construction of the index is explained in the Appen­
dix; it appears in the regressions as Political Monopoly 1945-1979.
There is the need to control for the initial value of the dependent vari­
able. The choice of the date, however, is open to interpretation. The 
dependent variable is alternatively lagged back to the beginning of the 
postwar era (Concentrated Banking 1945) and the end of the interwar period 
{Concentrated Banking 1938).
Table 2 lists OLS estimates of the model for two specifications, each 
corresponding to a different lagged value of the dependent variable. In both 
specifications, all the independent variables are signed correctly but fail to 
reach basic levels of significance (see regressions 1 and 2). The partial 
regression plots and the DFITS statistics (unreported) pointed to New 
Zealand as a clear-cut outlier.30 Although I have no explanation for why 
New Zealand should be an outlier, I re-estimated the two regressions includ­
ing a dummy variable for New Zealand (regressions 3 and 4).31 The coeffi­
cients of the independent variables increase while the corresponding standard 
errors decrease, allowing the fit of Political Monopoly and Anglo-Saxon to
30 On partial regression plots and DFITS statistics, see Bollen and Jackman 1990.
31 Dropping New Zealand from the sample would produce identical results, except for the 




























































































reach comfortable standards of significance. The fit of Right Orientation 
reaches standard level of significance only in the 1938 specification (regres­
sion 4).32
[ Table 2 ]
In sum, the findings strongly confirm the monopoly hypothesis, but are 
more ambiguous with respect to the left hypothesis. The radical orientation 
of the working class is both important and consistently felt across cases, but 
the mere spatial location on the left of the parties forming the government, 
even when controlling for radicalism, though important, is perhaps less con­
sistently so. Overall, there is sufficient evidence to confirm the hypothesis 
that various mixes of fair access to government, left, and Marxism were 
favorable to the small capitalists, whereas different combinations of monop­
oly, right, and liberalism or laborism were favorable to concentrated banking.
State Banking and Local-Nonprofit Banking
If the existence of a powerful working class promoted a non-market 
path, it remains to determine which one. There were three alternatives to 
concentrated banking: state banking, nonprofit banking, and local banking. 
State banking is the allocation of credit by state banks, directly or through 
non-state banks. State banks, which may be owned or not by the state, are 
usually financed by bonds, held by state savings banks or non-state financial 
institutions (commercial banks, savings banks, insurances). State banks enjoy 
borrowing privileges. They are usually specialized (one lends to local
32 A look at the partial regression plots and a calculation o f the DFITS statistics for 
specifications 3 and 4 pointed, this time, to the United States as a new outlier. Re- 
estimating the model without the United States strengthened the results in both cases, 
though insufficiently so to bring the coefficient for Right Orientation in regression 3 to a 




























































































governments, another to farmers, still another to home owners or small 
firms, or to firms in need of venture capital, etc.)- They were founded to 
meet a strongly-felt need of credit by a category of borrowers whose relative 
borrowing power from the capital market is below their political power. A 
lot of them were set up before and after World War II, with the main purpose 
of extending medium- and long-term credit to small- and medium-sized busi­
ness. Instances of such state banks include the Dutch Middenstandsbank 
(1927) and Herstelbank (1945),33 the Swedish AB Industrikredit (1934,)34 the 
Italian Mediocredito (1952) and the Cassa per il Crédita all imprese Artigiane 
(1947,)35 the French Crédit National (1919)36 and Crédit Hôtelier, Commer­
cial et Industriel (1923), the Industrial Finance Department of the Com­
monwealth Bank (1945) in Australia,37 the Canadian Industrial Development 
Bank (1944),38 the Belgian Caisse Nationale de Crédit aux Classes Moyennes 
(1937) and Société Nationale d'investissement (1962),39 the Spanish Crédita 
Oficial,40 the Manufacturing Bank of Norway (1936)41, the British Industrial 
and Commercial Finance Corporation (1945),42 the German Kreditanstalt fur 
Wiederaufbau (1948) and Industriekreditbank A.G.-Deutsche Industriebank 
(1949).43 The list is far from being exhaustive.
Nonprofit and local banking are two additional specialized forms of 
banking. Specialization obtains, not along sectoral or class lines as in state 
banking, but along geographic lines. Both savings banks (to which one would
33 See Batenburg, Brouwer, and Louman 1954, 633-38.
34 See Thunholm 1954, p. 689.
35 Gerbi 1954, p. 489.
36 On the Crédit National, see Baubeau, Lavit d'Hautefort, and Lescure, 1994.
37 Hytten 1954, 35.
38 Marsh 1954, p. 157.
39 Van Molle 1995.
40 Clayton 1962. Pérez 1997.
41 Knutsen 1995, p.94.
42 Coopey and Clarke 1995.




























































































add credit cooperatives and mortgage societies) and locally-chartered com­
mercial banks in effect are local banks, irrespective of their affiliation to cen­
tral giro mechanisms. They play an important role in providing banking 
services to regions and classes of producers that are peripheral to the finan­
cial center. All these banks benefit from legal privileges that allow them to 
compete with concentrated banks—savings banks and credit cooperatives typi­
cally pay no (or less) taxes, enjoy a state guarantee on their deposits, whereas 
local banks enjoy a de facto local monopoly, receive transfers from center 
banks (the U.S. FDIC), or enjoy a local-government guarantee (the Swiss 
Kantonalbanken) .
Any of these three forms of banking could serve the electoral purposes 
of politicians dependent on the support of small business owners: state bank­
ing through the creation of still another specialized bank; nonprofit banking 
by the legislation of regulations tilting market competition in favor of savings 
banks, mortgage banks, and credit cooperatives; or local banking by further 
limiting branching. The decision whether they chose to promote one option 
or the other rested on purely pragmatic grounds, merely sanctioning past 
development: what was most developed before World War II is what would 
be further developed after World War II. What accounted then for which 
non-market path a country would adopt before World War II?44
The degree of centralization of political institutions, emphasized by 
institutionalists like Zysman, is the best answer that I have found. His­
torically, centralized states (UK, France, Belgium, Japan, the Netherlands) 
showed an inclination for state banking, less centralized states (Germany,
44 This is not to say that left governments had no centralizing preferences. Left 
governments promoted nationally-negotiated wage settlements and a centralizing welfare 
state. However, these policies were essentially targeted to the labor market. Moreover, 
even with respect to the labor market, left governm ents did not try to create a 
homogeneous labor market by favoring labor geographic mobility, but by bringing work 




























































































Austria, Italy, Sweden, Denmark), for nonprofit banking, and fully decentral­
ized, federal states (the United States, Switzerland), for local banking.45 The 
reason, I surmise, laid in the conflicts that accompanied the process of state 
formation. State treasuries were the largest capita! borrowers; as Colbert's 
comparison of bankers with soldiers vividly suggests, they had a vested inter­
est in marshalling capital markets to their benefit and to the extent of the 
regulatory power that they possessed. The extent of this regulatory power 
depended on the presence of other potential borrowers and their respective 
power. The most consistent opponents of central treasuries' efforts to widen 
the circulation of state debt were local governments, who sought to retain 
local capital for their own use and for local investment.
The dominions constitute a special case, however, in which the organi­
zation of the capital market was simultaneous, if not prior, to the organization 
of the state. Also, the dominion capital market structures reflected British 
influence. Bank charters were submitted for approval to the government in 
London before autonomy. This historical circumstance is responsible for an 
unusually centralized capital market structure common to all dominions: 
branch banking was legal across Canadian provinces and across Australasian 
states, irrespective of federal institutions in Canada and Australia and unitary 
in New Zealand.
Table 3 provides OLS estimates of the state-centralization model. The 
dependent variables respectively are the market shares of state banking 
(regressions 1 and 2) and of local and nonprofit banking combined (regres­
sions 3 and 4), once again measured in 1963 assets. Local banking is com­
bined with nonprofit banking in equations 3 and 4 in order to keep the test
45 There were exceptions to this generalization. Spain had a centralized state and yet had 
no state banking in 1913; Norway had a semi-centralized state, and yet a significantly 




























































































tractable; combined with local banking, nonprofit banking is expected to be a 
negative linear function of state centralization, whereas alone it could also 
well be an inverted-U function of state centralization.46 The institutional vari­
able (Tax Centralization 1880) is a tax proxy of state centralization--the share 
of the central government in the appropriation of all taxes levied in the nation 
circa 1880. It is a suitable proxy because, like banking, it bears on states' 
never-ending need for cash, yet with a priori no known relation with banking. 
No data prior to 1880 could be found (see appendix). Since I have no special 
expectation as to how the dominions, each one or as a group, should behave 
in the state-centralization model, they are excluded from the sample. The test 
controls for the lagged value of the dependent variable. I chose the years 
1938 and 1913, preceding each war, to avoid incorporating the shocks of war 
on state banking.47 Controlling for an earlier value of the dependent variable 
is also desirable for an argument about institutional path dependence.
[ Table 3 ]
The findings offer tangible confirmation that the type of non-market path 
was a function of state centralization. The coefficient of the independent 
variable (Tax Centralization) is correctly signed and significant across specifi­
cations. Testing for outlying DFITS values found none in regressions 1 and
28
46 The expected shape of the curve would depend on whether local governments in federal 
states (Switzerland and the United States), when exercising the right to charter local 
banks, have a preference for commercial banks or nonprofit banks; if  they all prefer 
commercial banks, then the relation betwen nonprofit banking market share and state 
centralization is an inverted-U curve; if, on the contrary they all prefer nonprofit banks, 
then the relationship is a declining linear function; if they differ in preference, or have no 
particular preference, then the expected curve is heteroscedastic. Combining local with 
nonprofit banking is also justified in light o f the rare occurrence o f  local banking; only 
two countries had locally-chartered banks throughout the 19th and 20th centuries—the 
United States and Switzerland—making testing superfluous. A third country, Australia, 
also had local banking on the order o f 3 percent o f total assets. The insignificance of 
Australian local banking, along with the difficulty in gathering data in any consistent way 
thereon, led me to dismiss Australian local banking from the dataset.
47 The 1945 values for State Banking were considerably inflated by World War II; for half 
of the cases, the 1945 value is superior to the 1963 value for no other reason that banking 



























































































4, but the Netherlands in regression 2, and the U.S. in regression 3. Drop­
ping the outliers from their corresponding regression weakened the coeffi­
cient and the fit for the variable Tax Centralization (results unreported). 
Therefore, there is substantial, though not overwhelming, evidence that the 
choice of nonmarket path in the postwar era followed a logic of path depend­
ence.
One can say, to summarize the findings of the last two sections, that the 
relative political power of the small capitalists explains the extent to which 
the nonmarket path was pursued after World War II, while state institutions 
explain the type of non-market path favored in each country.
29
The Return to the Market Path
The picture we drew for the postwar era is no longer valid today. State 
banking has lost ground to other forms of banking everywhere except in 
Germany, where it is stable, and in Japan, where it has risen sharply. The 
relative share of concentrated banking is up dramatically (except in the 
United States and Norway where it is about the same, and Denmark, Spain 
and Japan, where it has declined). Local and nonprofit banking are relatively 
stable, except for a sharp drop in Britain and sharp increases in Spain and 
Japan.
This recovery of the concentrated, profit-oriented banking sector, which 
is presently happening in most countries, has been attributed to the 
simultaneous deregulation of banking and the globalization of finance.48 This 
is not the place to assess the validity of this claim. But, be they cause or 
effect, deregulation and openness could only occur along with a revolution in
48 See Andrews 1994, Cerny 1995, Frieden and Rogowski 1996, Goodman and Pauly 



























































































the political economy of postwar banking~the political weakening of the 
small capitalists. Moreover, there is considerable variation around the trend, 
and no explanation is persuasive that cannot account for it. The current 
changes observable in banking markets, I argue, are coterminous with the 
decline of class politics and the re-emergence of territorial politics.
Distributional conflicts in the 19th century, I argued earlier, were allo­
cated according to territorial politics—a policy process that favored the banks 
and the firms that were located in powerful jurisdictions. In centralized 
countries, the geographic qua financial center played that role, whereas in 
less centralized countries, financial peripheries could also claim a share of the 
spoils. The more decentralized a country's state institutions were, the more 
regulated and fragmented the capital market was. The interwar era super­
posed a second policy process—class politics. Class politics generalized the 
distributional cleavage governing labor markets to the party system. Class 
politics obtained where the party system was equally split between a working- 
class bloc and an employer bloc, with each side enjoying an about equal 
chance of governing. The left-right competition could be overt and all-out or, 
given the risk of polarization, contained through consociational devices or 
corporatist bargaining. Class politics gave the losers of the geographically- 
cleft capital market new opportunities to circumvent market concentration. 
By allying with the left, or merely threatening to do so, the small capitalists 
were able to extract regulatory rents from the central government. State 
banking especially flourished in countries like France, postwar Belgium, and 
the Netherlands, where state centralization had traditionally foreclosed the 
local government route to small capitalists. In less centralized countries, 
class politics merely helped consolidate the territorial rents for local and non­





























































































Class politics did not last. The embourgeoisement of the working class, 
the inability of Keynesian macroeconomic policies to deal with the price 
shocks of the seventies, and various other reasons triggered a right shift by 
the voters and the parties representing them. Left and right governments 
began to pursue the pro-market policies advocated by the neo-liberal right. 
The collapse of the Soviet Bloc lifted off all semblance of partisan polariza­
tion. Electoral politics became a specie of Downs' (1957) median voting 
model, with voter normally distributed, a sizable floating vote, and the policy 
orientation of successive governments differing only at the margin.
The first rents to be sacrificed to this new economic experiment were 
those enjoyed by the small capitalists, as it was politically easier to dismantle 
rents in the capital market than in the labor market. More specifically, 
among the three forms of sheltered banking-local, nonprofit and state—state 
banking was the most negatively affected; state banks lost their borrowing 
privileges. State banking was the most negatively affected because it owed its 
existence entirely to class politics. In contrast, local and nonprofit banking, 
which had pre-existed class politics, better withstood the collapse of class 
politics.
The present discussion yields a testable proposition: the recent surge in 
concentrated banking was more marked in countries with more state banking. 
These were, first, the countries with moderate or low levels of state cen­
tralization, in which the existing fragmentation in favor of local and nonprofit 
banks antedated the advent of class politics. These were, second, the 
countries which, even though they had centralized state institutions, had little 
state banking to shed (Spain and Japan), because they had been governed by 
right monopolies during the postwar era, a form of government that was 




























































































Table 4 presents OLS estimates for the decline-of-state-banking model. 
The dependent variable is the relative asset share of the concentrated banking 
sector in 1983. The first independent variable is the asset share of the state 
banking sector in 1963 (State Banking 1963). The expected relation is posi­
tive: the larger state banking was in 1963, the larger concentrated banking 
should have become in 1983. Conversely, one would expect a negative rela­
tion of the same magnitude between local-nonprofit banking in 1963 and con­
centrated banking 1983. In other words, the larger local-nonprofit banking in 
1963, the smaller concentrated banking in 1983. The second independent 
variable (Right Monopoly 1945-1979) is an interaction term: the product of 
the monopoly index with the spatial position of the government on the left- 
right axis. Both indices were recalculated to cover the period 1945-1979. 
The control variable is the 1963 value of the dependent variable 
{Concentrated Banking 1963).
[ Table 4 ]
The results conform with our expectations: both independent variables 
are signed correctly and meet standard levels of significance. Since both 
variables, Concentrated Banking 1963 and State Banking 1963, have a posi­
tive sign, therefore Local & Nonprofit Banking 1963 has, by way of defini­
tion, a negative sign of equivalent magnitude and significance than State 
Banking 1963 (results unreported). A sensitivity analysis (DFITS) detects 
three outliers (Britain, Italy, Japan, and New Zealand). The re-estimated 
model without these three observations not surprisingly shrinks the coefficient 
for the variable right monopoly—Italy and Japan were two of the three right 
monopolies (the third being Spain). Coefficient and fit for the State Banking 
variable, however, are robust.
The demise of class politics brings capital politics back to its pre-1914 



























































































back then within the broader rivalry between center and periphery; strong 
local governments could enable small banks and their clients to fend off 
absorption or competition from larger predators, whereas weak local jurisdic­
tions could not. Features of the past are re-emerging. The deregulation of 
finance and the freeing of cross-border flows make local and regional com­
munities important again. Privatization, along with the opening of national 
markets, frees up scale economies, which market actors seek to capture by 
becoming transnational; savers and firms invest abroad. The typical state's 
response in Europe has been to devolve regulatory powers which, until then, 
were exercised by national local governments, to the European Commission. 
Simultaneously, budget constraints have forced central governments to com­
press the sums traditionally devoted to regional development policies, with 
local and regional communities left to bear the burden of change. Local com­
munities are pressed to make themselves attractive to savers and firms, both 
local and external. Regions are increasingly locked into a race of which the 
winners may well be those that, in addition to their natural resources, have 
the most policy instruments at their disposal.49 The German and Italian 
industrial districts, along with the much acclaimed Silicon Valley, have 
become the models to emulate. The upshot is an intensification of 
regionalism. Demands for devolution downward are aired from every corner 
of Europe, leading three of the most centralized governments (Spain, France, 
and Britain) to engage on the road of institutional decentralization.50
However, centralized states, except perhaps for Spain and Belgium, will 
most likely remain centralized, making it hard for their local banks and 
industries to face the shock of financial globalization. This time, however,
40 See Keating 1997.
50 Note that these decentralizing reforms were the doing of left governments, a move that, 
in light o f  the present analysis, may be interpreted as the continuation, or re-creation, of 




























































































the potential losers of financial globalization will have no other choice but to 
play by the rules of the capital market, viz. absorb or be absorbed.
34
Conclusion
The tactical alliance between small- and locally-based business, on the 
one hand, and the parties of the working class, on the other hand, begat state 
banking. The state assumed the role of creditor in countries where the 
alliance was strong, especially so in those with centralized state institutions 
(France, postwar Belgium, the Netherlands, and New Zealand), in which 
local governments lacked the regulatory power that would have allowed them 
to come to the help of small, local capitalists. The tactical alliance between 
left and small capitalists was the product of a particular period, the interwar 
and postwar years, and a specific place, continental Europe. The party 
system of these countries was cleft along, and polarized by, the class 
cleavage, thereby placing small capitalists in the enviable position of arbitra­
ting the conflict between the capitalist right and the working-class left. In the 
few cases where the partisan balance was ruptured in favor of one side, as 
such was the case in autocratic Spain and Christian-Democratic Italy, the 
small capitalists had much less leverage and were unable to extract state 
banking.
State banking was an exceptional and ephemeral form of state interven­
tion in the allocation of credit. It was the product of a unique set of circum­
stances, not of any logic internal to the capital market. State intervention in 
the capital market, when any, takes the more usual route of local banking, be 
it in the overt form of locally-chartered, locally-regulated banks or in the 
more occult, yet not less effective, form of nonprofit banking. The banking 



























































































tapped by the branch of a money center bank, can travel almost anywhere 
within the country or abroad. Local governments, in contrast, are kin to see 
local savings invested in local projects and seek to that effect to promote 
local banks. In all countries but France, Britain, and, to a lesser extent, Bel­
gium, New Zealand, and the Netherlands, incomplete state-building provided 
local governments with the regulatory means to fragment the market for capi­
tal along territorial lines. Local and nonprofit banking were dominant in 
decentralized countries before World War I; they remained important during 
the heyday of state banking; they are still important today, after the parting of 
state banking.
The demise of state banking marks the end of an epoch. State banking 
was the product of class politics, redefining all issues around the employer- 
employee cleavage, a template borrowed from the labor market. Labor 
market considerations, such as full employment, reigned supreme from the 
1930s until the neo-liberal revolution of the 1970s. Enthroning price 
stability, the neo-liberal revolution emancipated the capital market from its 
prior subordination to the labor market. It may have also turned the tables 
against the labor market. Territorial politics is once again the modus 
operandi in the capital market and, to the extent that more labor conflicts are 
decentralized to the local level, in the labor market as well.
The demise of state banking may take us a century back, to a time when 
the countries that were the most dependent per capita on cross-border capital 
flows were those that were the most politically centralized, irrespective of 
whether they were net creditor, like Britain, France, and the Netherlands, or 
debtor, like Canada and Australasia.5' Global overstretch in those countries 
eventually gave rise to the so-called Macmillan gap, referring to the conclu- 51
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sion reached in 1931 by an eponymous British parliamentary committee that 































































































[ Table 5 ]
Political Monopoly
In an ideal electoral system, a party's length of stay in government 
should be proportional to its share of the popular vote. The further away is a 
party from this equilibrium, the more monopolistic the party system. The 
index calculates for each party the difference between the average electoral 
score
with Vjt, party i's total votes at year t (for years without elections, I ued 
the prior election-year results),
V, the total number of votes cast at year t (same qualifier),
T the number of years.
and the number of years in government (weighted by the relative electoral 




























































































with VtU the number of votes received by the parties forming the coali­
tion government at year t (same qualifier as for Vit),
Gii ~ [0,1] depending on whether party i at time t is part of the 
government (G,, = 1) or not (G|,=0),
for the period starting in 1945 or 1946, depending on when the first elections 
were held (but no later than 1946), and ending December 31, 1979.
Party indices in each country sum up to 0, because one party's surplus is 
another's deficit. By taking the absolute value of each party's score, and 
adding them, one gets an aggregate value that reflects the distance between 
share and profit for the party system as a whole (AfeR: 0 < M <  l) .52 The for­




To take into account the peculiarity of the U.S. case (presidential, with 
several occurrences of divided government), I made two assumptions: (1) 
there exists four parties: republican congressional, republican presidential, 
democratic congressional, and democratic presidential (dividing their actual 
results by half so that the VJV^ ratios add up to unity); (2) all governments 
are coalition governments that include a congressional party and a presi­
dential party. To take into account the peculiarity of the Spanish case (dic­
52 I prefer to use absolute values rather than the more mathematically correct Euclidian 
distance between share and profit in an /V-dimensional space, with N  representing the 
number of parties (Verdier 1995). The distribution obtained by means o f the latter 
procedure, although no different from the one generated through absolute values in terms 



























































































tatorship), I assigned to each year of dictatorship the highest M  score 
recorded among other countries.
39
Government Partisan orientation (RIGHT)
The index of partisan orientation of the government is an average calcu­
lated over two periods: January 1, 1945-December 31, 1969 and January 1, 
1945-December 31, 1979. The index was calculated, first, by assigning to 
each party a positive integer i (ieZ+) according to the ordinal pattern: 1 to the 
most leftist party, 2 to the next to the most leftist, and so on, until all parties 
are ordinally arranged on a left-right axis. Each i was then assigned a posi­
tive real number p, (p^R: 0 </?;< 1) to reflect each party's share of the elec­
torate, according to the formula:
ri i-i 
Pi - —  + E r.j, 
2 j-0
with r,, party i 's percentage of votes, and j  an integer representing the 
parties on the left of i, with 0 < /< / ', and ^ = 0  if j = 0.
Last, the government orientation index pg (pgeR: 0 < <  1 ) was calcu­
lated by averaging the p,'s for those parties in government at any point during 
the covered period:
1 T N





























































































with Git =  [0,1] depending on whether party i at time t is part of the 
government (G;,= 1) or not (Git=0),
T the number of years,
N  the number of parties.
To take into account the peculiarity of Spain who experienced years of 
rightist dictatorship, I assigned to each year of dictatorship the highest 
score among other countries.
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Table 1 : Asset Market Shares of the Four Banking Sectors
1 II III IV I II III IV
UK 0.79 0.09 0.12 0 0.60 0.22 0.17 0
Canada 0.77 0.20 0.03 0 0.85 0.14 0.01 0
Japan 0.74 0.12 0.14 0 0.63 0.13 0.24 0
Spain 0.74 0.26 0 0 0.65» 0 .17h 0.17b 0b
Sweden 0.67 0.32 0.01 0 0.49 0.45 0.06 0
Australia 0.66 0.33 0.01 0 0.51 0.29 0.20 0
Belgium 0.56 0.03 0.41 0 0.40r 0.01f 0.59f 0f
Italy 0.51 0.34 0.15 0 0.41 0.34 0.25 0
France 0.50 0.06 0.44 0 0.38» 0.06» 0.55» 0»
Norway 0.49 0.37 0.14 0 0.32 0.46 0.23 0
New Zealand 0.48 0.10 0.42 0 0.36» 0.12» 0.52» 0»
the Netherlands 0.47 0.42 0.11 0 0.39 0.39 0.22 0
USA 0.42» 0.18» 0» 0.40» 0.35 0.20 0.14 0.31
Austria 0.37b 0.60b 0.03b 0b na na na na
Denmark 0.29 0.71 0 0 0.28 0.72 0.01 0
Switzerland 0.26 0.29 0.01 0.43 0.24 0.23 0.01 0.52
Germany 0.25 0.75 0 0 0.14 0.81 0.05 0
1963 1983
I II III IV I 11 III IV
UK 0.57 0.26 0.17 0 0.84 0.13 0.03 0
Canada 0.76 0.23 0.01 0 na na na na
Japan 0.58 0.23 0.19 0 0.32 0.36 0.32 0
Spain 0.65 0.21 0.14 0 0.62 0.09 0.29 0
Sweden 0.41 0.48 0.11 0 0.50 0.48 0.02 0
Australia 0.70 0.13 0.14 0.04 na na na na
Belgium 0.40 0.06 0.54 0 0.68 0.07 0.25 0
Italy 0.51 0.35 0.14 0 0.61 0.35 0.40 0
France 0.43 0.06 0.51 0 0.52 0.09 0.39 0
Norway 0.33 0.35 0.32 0 0.33 0.35 0.32 0
New Zealand 0.29 0.16 0.55 0 0.67 0.17 0.16 0
the Netherlands 0.34 0.32 0.34 0 0.54» 0.27» 0.19» 0
USA 0.35 0.33 0.04 0.28 0.37 0.32 0.06 0.25
Austria 0.34c 0.54c 0.12c 0c 0.38 0.54 0.08 0
Denmark 0.44 0.52 0.04 0 0.39d 0.61d 0d 0d
Switzerland 0.36 0.20 0.04 0.40 0.56 na 0.02 na
Germany 0.21 0.67 0.12 0 0.22 0.69 0.10 0



























































































II Nonprofit banking sector, savings banks, mutual credit societies, mortgage banks.
III State banking sector, postal savings, all or part o f the savings banks in France and 
Belgium, government and semi-public banks.
IV Local banking sector: commercial banks regulated by local governments, such as 
State banks in the United States, and local and cantonal banks in Switzerland. The four 
sectors add up to unity.
* 1912.
b Austria and the Czech Lands.
' 1984.





Sources: Goldsmith 1969, completed with, for Australia: Butlin, Hall and White, 1971; 
White 1973; Official Year Book of Australia. Austria (ustria and the Czech Lands in 
1913): Mitchell 1992 , 774 , 781; Statistiches Jahrbuch: Osterreichische Nationalbank; 
Diwok 1982. Belgium: Société des nation 1931, 116; M itchell 1992, 781, 784; 
Annuaire statistique de la Belgique: OECD. Canada: Société des nations 1931, 329; 
Canadian Yearbook. Denmark: Société des nations 1931, 125; Johansen 1985. France: 
Mitchell 1992 , 774 , 782; Bayliss and Philip 1980, 127; Banque de France; Conseil 
National du Crédit. Germany: Deutsche Bundesbank 1976; Statistisches Jahrbuch für 
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Italy: Mitchell 1992, 774, 782; Société des nations 
1931, 187; Garofalo and Colonna 1997; Banca d'ltalia a, b. Japan: Tamaki 1995, 223- 
36; OECD. The Netherlands: Nederlandsche Bank 1987, 34, 48, 52; OECD. New 
Zealand: Société des nations 1931, 447: New Zealand Official Yearbook: Bloomfield 
1984. Norway: Société des nations 1931, 199; Mitchell 1992, 782; Statistisk Arhok. 
Spain: Martin-Acefia 1995, 522; Mitchell 1992, 782; OECD; Banco de Espana 1986, 
1996. Sweden: Société des nations 1931, 275; Mitchell 1992, 783; Statistisk Arshok 
for Sveriee: Sveriges Riksbank 1971; Bankaktiebolapen Fondkommissionârerna 
Fondbôrsen och VPC. Switzerland: Société des nations 1931, 288; International 
Monetary Fund 1962; Ritzmann 1973; Schweizerische Nationalbank. U .K .: Société 
des nations 1931, 260; Sheppard 1971; Annual Abstract o f Statistics. U .S .A .: Société 
des nations 1931, 346; Mitchell 1983, 775, 785; Statistical Abstract o f  the United 
States: U .S. Bureau of the Census 1975; Board of Governors o f the Federal Reserve 



























































































Table 2 : OLS Estimation of the Left and Monopoly Hypotheses
Dependent Variable: Asset Share of the Concentrated Banking Sector in 1963
expected
sign 1 2 3 4
Constant + /- -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05
(-0.33) (-0.13) (-0.50) (-0.65)
Concentrated + 0.73 0.37
Banking 1945 (3.57)*** (1.56)
Concentrated + 0.65 0.43
Banking 1938 (3.92)*** (3.30)**
Political Monopoly + 0.11 0.11 0.26 0.22
1945-1979 (0.90) (0.97) (2.14)* (2.62)**
Right Orientation + 0.11 0.21 0.26 0.31
1945-1969 (0.56) (1.20) (1.50) (2.51)*
Anglo-Saxon + 0.03 0.04 0.15 0.13
(0.53) (0.63) (2.07)* (2.83)**




























* p < 0 .1 0 , two-tailed test.
** p < 0 .0 5 , two-tailed test.
*** p < 0 .0 1 , two-tailed test.
Values o f /-statistics in parentheses.
• Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
Sources. Concentrated Banking 1938, 1945, and 1963 (the dependent variable): Table 
1. Political Monopoly 1945-1979 and Right Orientation 1945-1969: Table 5. Anglo- 
Saxon is a dummy variable for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U .K ., and the 



























































































Table 3: OLS Estimation of the State-Centralization Model
Dependent Asset Share of
Variable





Constant + /- -0.10 -0.07 + /- 0.38 0.44
(-1.28) (-0.92) (3.32)*** (3.14)**
State Banking + 0.71
1938 (5.57)***
State Banking + 0.85
1913 (5.82)***
Local & Nonprof. + 0.56
Banking 1938 (6.14)***
Local & Nonprof. + 0.52
Banking 1913 (4.58)***
Tax Centralization + 0.003 0.003 - -0.004 -0.004






















* p < 0 .1 0 , two-tailed test.
** p < 0 .0 5 , two-tailed test.
*** p < 0 .0 1 , two-tailed test.
Values o f /-statistics in parentheses.
■ Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
Sources. State Banking 1913, 1938, and 1963 (dependent variable) and Local & Non­




























































































Table 4: OLS Estimation of the Decline-of-State-Banking Model




Concentrated Banking 1963 















F-Value F (3 ,l l)= 4 .3 0
s. e. r. 0.1280
N 15“
Notes:
* p < 0 .1 0 , two-tailed test.
** p < 0 .0 5 , two-tailed test.
*** p < 0 .0 1 , two-tailed test.
Values of /‘-statistics in parentheses.
* Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Nether­
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
Sources. Concentrated Banking and State Banking: Table 1. Right Monopoly 1945- 
1979 is the product o f Right 1945-1979 and Political Monopoly 1945-1979; both vari­









































































































Australia 25 .66 .69 .67
Austria na .25 .56 .56
Belgium 85 .35 .56 .55
Canada 75 .76 .45 .44
Denmark 64 .61 .41 .42
France 83 .72 .64 .65
Germany 49 .22 .61 .49
Italy 55 .89 .64 .65
Japan na .88 .68 .70
Netherlands 87 .38 .56 .56
New Zealand 60 .53 .63 .62
Norway 60 .75 .38 .38
Spain 79 .89 .68 .68
Sweden 64 .83 .30 .34
Switzerland 37 .36 .57 .55
U.K. 70 .22 .51 .50
U .S .A . 33* .21 .45 .45
• 1902.
Note and Sources. Political Monopoly and Right Orientation: Appendix. Tax Cen­
tralization is central government taxes as percentage of general government taxes circa 
1880; for Western Europe, excluding Spain, Flora (1983, p. 273); data for Austria 
could not be used, for excluding the non-Austrian part o f the Empire; for Spain, Bemis 
(1919, 338, 347); for the United States, U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, p. 1119); 
for Canada, Canada Department of Agriculture (1890, 104, 117); data for Australia are 
for 1907 (Mitchell 1983, 802; Commonwealth Bureau o f  Census and Statistics 1908, 


























































































































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 





□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1998/99





































































































Working Papers in Political and Social Sciences 
Published since 1996
SPS No. 96/1 
Yossi SHAVIT/
Karin WESTERBEEK 




The Accommodation of Diversity in
European Policy Making and its
Outcomes: Regulatory Policy as a
Patchwork
SPS No. 96/3 
Daniel VERDIER
Gerschenkron on his Head: Banking 
Structures in 19th-Century Europe, 
North America, and Australasia
SPS No. 96/4 
Daniel VERDIER 
Democratization and Trade 




Democratic Convergence and Free
Trade
SPS No. 96/6 
Christian JOPPKE
Nation-Building after World War Two: 
Postcolonialism, Postcommunism, and 
Postfascism Compared
SPS No. 96/7 
Takis S. PAPPAS 
Grand Design, Narrow Choices: 
Conservatives and Democracy in 
Southern Europe
SPS No. 96/8
Arpâd SZAKOLCZAI/Lâszlé FÜSTÔS 
Value Systems in Axial Moments: A 




In a Permanent State of Transition:
Theorising the East European Condition
SPS No. 96/10
Paolo DON ATI
Environmentalism, Postmaterialism, and 




Durkheim, Weber and Parsons and the
Founding Experiences of Sociology
SPS No. 96/12 
Christoph KNILL 
Patterns of European Policy 
Development: The Case of Clean Air 
Policy
SPS No. 96/13 
Jocelyn EVANS 
Conceptualising the Left-Right 
Continuum as an Enduring Dimension 
of Political Competition
S i', .'i i  si*.
r i '  ' i '  'O
SPS No. 97/1 
Jean-Pierre CASSARINO 
The Theories of Ethnic Entrepreneur­
ship, and the Alternative Arguments of 
Social Action and Network Analysis
SPS No. 97/2 
Harald WYDRA
Imitating Capitalism and Democracy at 
a Distance - Identifying with Images in 
the Polish Transition
SPS No. 97/3 
Martin J. BULL
From PDS to Cosa 2 : The Second 
Congress o f the Democratic Party of the 
Left
SPS No. 97/4 
Philippe C. SCHMITTER/
Jurgen R. GROTE
The Corporatist Sisyphus: Past, Present 
& Future *



























































































SPS No. 97/5 
Agnes HORVATH
The Political Psychology of Trickster- 
Clown: An Analytical Experiment 
Around Communism as a Myth
SPS No. 97/6 
Giovanni CAPOCCIA 
Electoral Abuse in PR Systems: Old and 




The Use of Political Conditionality in
the EU’s Relations with Third
Countries: How Effective?
SPS No. 97/8 
Arpâd SZAKOLCZAI 
Norbert Elias and Franz Borkenau: 
Intertwined Life-Works
SPS No. 97/9
Christoph KNILL/Dirk LEHMKUHL 
The Globalisation of European Interest 




After Diagnosis. HIV, the Prospect of 








The Rise and Fall of State Banking: 
Financial Market Politics in Postwar 
OECD Countries
* out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
fco
no
f>
£
'e
I
.O '
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
